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Review of Special Reserve Panel Study on Nuclear War

REFERENCE: Memo to AD's from DD/I, Subject: "Special Reserve Panel Study",  
13 February 1958

1. The study on "Nuclear War: is a well-done piece of work, which contains some very good ideas and actually stimulates thinking about the relationship of CIA to nuclear war. Further consideration of a number of the conclusions and recommendations is called for in order to arrive at more clarified special roles for the various components of CIA.

2. Several points in the study require re-consideration before the study can suffice as an initial planning concept. There appears to be a bit of "fuzziness" regarding the role of CIA in a wartime situation; the actual involvement of only certain parts of CIA is referred to as "the CIA role". Some distinction needs to be made when reference is made to CIA in order to understand more precisely where the responsibility within CIA rests. Field elements of CIA become a part of the Theater Command and are responsive to military needs within the theater, except for requirements of major importance or scope which transcends military priorities and over which the military does not have control. This relationship needs to be taken into consideration.

3. The relationship between CIA war plans in regard to the use of strategic island areas versus military planning in theaters of operation need to be established in the discussion, and areas of overlapping interests and responsibilities dealt with in order to clarify what CIA elements can, in fact, do during wartime.

I am prompted to ask whether CIA will have field organizations independent of the military theater organization in time of war? The paper, it seems to me, evades any attempt to relate function to actual organizational makeup of CIA in the field and the relation of the field organization to the Theater Commanders.

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**SUBJECT: Review of Special Reserve Panel Study on Nuclear War**

Similarly, the kind of work they would be able to accept in a wartime situation would be related to the organization from whom direction would come. To speak freely about [REDACTED] doing the CIA job in a theater may be wishful thinking if the CIA job does not correspond closely to the military job in the theater.

5. The paper seems to ignore the intelligence analysis, estimating and coordination-of-views functions of CIA. Much of this would be necessary to the Agent operations discussed in some detail. Moreover, area, target, economic and political organization information of all sorts will be necessary at all war stages and it generally will not require the services of an Agent.

6. The suggestion in the paper that national policy concerning the employment of Nuclear War in the Satellites be re-appraised and re-thought appears to be sound from the CIA point of view in order that dissidence and reaction within the Satellites be encouraged and supported to the detriment of Soviet control.

7. The ability of Red China to stay neutral in a Nuclear exchange could be challenged. The Pacific Command, according to some, would not let Red China stay neutral for all sorts of reasons.

8. The scheme of declaring immunity from Nuclear attack for certain Satellite countries as a tactic in making them available for guerilla and other CIA-controlled operations appears to ignore the fact that such a declaration could simply provide the Soviets with a secure haven for their use and their redeployment purposes. It is suggested that the declaration carry with it the condition that Soviet military forces are resisted and kept out. This would appear much more effective as a means of obtaining [REDACTED]

9. It is suggested that Mr. Amory make some use of the report on Operation Alert, 1957, as the report pegs many of the points overlooked in this study.

Distribution:

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